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INTRODUCTION 
In January 2007, President Iajuddin Ahmed declared a state 
of emergency in Bangladesh amidst violent street protests over 
feared vote-rigging in the run-up to planned elections. 1  A 
military-backed interim government ruled Bangladesh for most 
of the next two years on a platform aimed at cleaning up the 
country’s democratic institutions through an ambitious 
anticorruption program.2 
The military takeover in Bangladesh capped a decade of 
“good governance” coups in South and Southeast Asia, where 
militaries justified their interventions on the basis of widespread 
frustration with incompetent and corrupt political leaders.3 Two 
other prominent examples were Pakistan and Thailand. General 
Pervez Musharraf came to power in Pakistan in 1999, after 
deposing Prime Minister Muhammad Nawaz Sharif, who led an 
unpopular government marred by graft and ineffective 
governance. 4  In 2006, the Thai military pushed President 
Thaksin Shinawatra into exile amidst street demonstrations over 
the President’s allegedly heavy-handed rule, vote-buying, and 
improper sale of his telecommunications company.5 
In Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Thailand, the supposed 
corruption of democratically elected leaders was not only used 
as one of the primary justifications for the military-backed 
takeover, but also as an instrument for sustaining it. These 
military-backed governments claimed that corruption had to be 
                                                                                                             
1. See President Declares State of Emergency, UNITED NEWS OF BANGL., Jan. 11, 2007, 
available at LEXIS.  
2. See Somini Sengupta & Julfikar Ali Manik, Secular Party Wins Landslide Victory in 
Bangladesh, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/ 2008/12/31/ world/ 
asia/ 31bangladesh.html. 
3. See infra Part IV.B (explaining the “good governance” coups in both Pakistan 
and Thailand and comparing each to the Bangladeshi experience). 
4. See General Pervez Musharraf, Address to Pakistan (Oct. 17, 1999). An English 
translation is available at http://www.pakistani.org/ pakistan/ constitution / post_ 
12oct99/ musharraf_address_17oct1999.html. See also Tim Weiner & Steve LeVine, 
Pakistan’s Ruler Pledges to Curb Corruption, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 1999, 
http://www.nytimes.com/ 1999/ 10/17/world/pakistan-s-ruler-pledges-to-curb-
corruption.html. 
5. See Tom Ginsburg, Constitutional Afterlife: The Continuing Impact of Thailand’s 
Postpolitical Constitution, 7 INT’L J. CONST. L. 83, 97–98 (2009); John Aglionby, Thai 
Military Revives Thaksin Corruption Inquiry, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Sept. 25, 2006, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/ world/ 2006/ sep/ 25/ thailand. 
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eliminated before civilian democratic rule could successfully 
take root and flourish. 6  They revitalized anticorruption 
commissions and attempted to remake the civilian political 
landscape by using corruption charges to imprison, exile, or 
marginalize political leaders, frequently with the complicity of 
the judiciary and international community. Simultaneously, the 
military-backed governments passed laws and created other 
institutions that promoted “good governance” to lay the 
groundwork for more controlled and tempered political parties 
and politicians once civilian democratic rule returned.7 
Curiously, little academic attention has focused on how 
charges of corruption have been used as a tool by the military to 
seize political power. For example, anticorruption commissions 
have been praised by some for producing “significant, sustained 
reductions of corruption”8 but criticized by others as “likely to 
fail” while undermining the “credibility of [politicians’] 
commitment to reform.” 9  Meanwhile, the repeated use of 
charges of corruption to target democratically elected leaders 
during military-backed takeovers has largely escaped scrutiny.10 
Anticorruption campaigns form a central plank of the 
“good governance” efforts of international organizations’ 
development agendas.11 Like most “good governance” or “rule 
                                                                                                             
6. See Clark Neher, Democratization in Thailand, 21 ASIAN AFF.: AM. REV. 195, 195 
(1995). 
7. See infra notes 163–64, 173–80 and accompanying text (describing the military-
backed government’s efforts in Pakistan to establish a democracy free from 
corruption); infra notes 202–11 and accompanying text (discussing the military-backed 
government’s attempts in Thailand to revitalize democracy and remove corruption 
from civilian political institutions). 
8 . Michael Johnston, A Brief History of Anticorruption Agencies, in THE SELF-
RESTRAINING STATE: POWER AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN NEW DEMOCRACIES 217 (Andreas 
Schedler et al. eds., 1999). 
9. JOHN R. HEILBRUNN, WORLD BANK INST., ANTI-CORRUPTION COMMISSIONS: 
PANACEA OR REAL MEDICINE TO FIGHT CORRUPTION? 1 (2004), available at 
http://siteresources .worldbank.org / WBI/Resources/ wbi37234Heilbrunn.pdf. 
10. See, e.g., USAID, ANTICORRUPTION AGENCIES (ACAS): OFFICE OF DEMOCRACY 
AND GOVERNANCE ANTICORRUPTION PROGRAM BRIEF 6 (2006) (stating that “[w]hile 
[anticorruption agencies] are not likely established with this as their stated purpose, 
once created, they are often manipulated by the ruling party to attack and eliminate 
members of the opposition or to punish members of their own party who are perceived 
as having stepped out of line,” but not commenting on the potential abuse by the 
military of anticorruption agencies). 
11. See, e.g., Democracy & Governance, USAID, http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/
democracy_and_governance/technical_areas/anti-corruption/ (last visited Jan. 11, 
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of law” efforts, these campaigns are often portrayed as politically 
neutral. However, in practice, they are not.12 Both national 
anticorruption advocates and the international community are 
severely constrained in pointing out corruption within the 
military or the military’s own potential political biases when it 
prosecutes civilian corruption. The military’s revered status as 
the protector of the country and the highest emblem of its 
sovereignty makes it difficult to either bring these charges or 
remind the public of the military’s past malfeasance. The result 
is a one-sided picture of corrupt and incompetent politicians 
versus a disciplined and incorruptible military. In turn, military-
backed governments exploit this asymmetry. 
This is the anticorruption paradox: while widespread, 
unchecked corruption undermines the legitimacy of democratic 
institutions, anticorruption campaigns may also inadvertently 
threaten democratic institutions in countries with politically 
active militaries by weakening civilian leaders while leaving the 
military largely unscathed.13 As such, anticorruption efforts can 
help lay the groundwork for a “good governance” coup. Part I 
of this Article describes how anticorruption and “good 
governance” campaigns helped justify and perpetuate recent 
military rule in Bangladesh. After declaring a state of emergency 
in 2007 (the “Emergency”) and restoring calm, the military-
backed government did not immediately move to hold elections. 
Instead, it proceeded, with the complicity of the international 
community, to place most of the country’s leading politicians in 
jail on corruption charges in a sweeping, and seemingly 
                                                                                                             
2012) (“Corruption poses a serious development challenge. In the political realm, it 
can seriously undermine democracy and good governance. . . . Corruption also 
undermines economic development.”); Governance & Anti-Corruption, WORLD BANK, 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/WBI/EXTWBIGOVANTCOR/
0,,menuPK:1740542~pagePK:64168427~piPK:64168435~theSitePK:1740530,00.html 
(last visited Jan. 11, 2012) (“The World Bank views good governance and anti-
corruption as important to its poverty alleviation mission.”). 
12. See David Kennedy, The International Anti-Corruption Campaign, 14 CONN. J. 
INT’L L. 455, 456, 465 (1999) (stating that his opposition to the global anticorruption 
campaign, Kennedy argues that the international community uses the campaign to gain 
legitimacy for its interventions in the developing world because it is seen as nonpolitical 
and noncontroversial. Yet, he claims these interventions have both very contestable 
political and economic presumptions and consequences). 
13. For the purposes of this Article, “politically active militaries” refers to those 
militaries that have a history of directly or indirectly ruling a country. 
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planned, remake of the Bangladeshi political order. 14  The 
military justified these drastic steps by claiming that the country 
had to rid itself of corruption before a return to democracy was 
possible. 
Part II turns to the response of the Bangladeshi courts to 
this far-reaching anticorruption drive. Despite protests from the 
military-backed government, the High Court Division of the 
Bangladesh Supreme Court ordered the release of many of the 
accused politicians on bail.15 Although the most far-reaching of 
these judgments were eventually overturned by the Appellate 
Division of the Supreme Court, 16  the High Court’s orders 
provided perhaps the first and most visible act of defiance to the 
military-backed Emergency, speeding the return to civilian rule. 
This Article claims that in “good governance” coups, the 
military frequently seeks out validation, or at least acquiescence, 
by the judiciary, in part because corruption charges against 
civilian leaders require the judiciary’s cooperation to be an 
effective political instrument. As a result, even as anticorruption 
efforts may strengthen the military against political actors, the 
judiciary can use the “good governance” paradigm to become a 
more powerful counterweight to the military than might 
otherwise be expected.  
Part III describes Bangladesh’s return to democracy and 
the ultimate failure of the military’s anticorruption drive. The 
Bangladesh example shows how the inevitable political 
maneuvering of the military during an emergency can permeate 
anticorruption efforts, thereby undercutting not only the 
                                                                                                             
14. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 62-930PDF, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
PRACTICES FOR 2008, at 2184 (2010), available at http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/
2008/sca/119132.htm (nonpaginated version) [hereinafter 2008 HUMAN RIGHTS 
REPORT]; infra notes 58–61 and accompanying text (detailing the support of Western 
nations for the military-backed government's attack on the corruption of the political 
parties and bureaucracy and suggesting that the West was instrumental in the coup); 
infra notes 79–84 (describing the support of international institutions, such as the 
World Bank and Human Rights Watch, for the military-backed government's 
anticorruption efforts). 
15. See infra notes 106–08, 115–18 and accompanying text (discussing the instances 
in which the High Court Division granted bail to many accused of corruption). 
16. See infra notes 106–12, 115–19 and accompanying text (explaining the High 
Court Division's attempts at taking an aggressive stance against executive power under 
the 2007 state of emergency and the Appellate Division's reversal of such judgments). 
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legitimacy of these efforts, but the institutions that undertake 
them.17 
Part IV briefly examines similar recent “good governance” 
coups in Pakistan and Thailand. Anticorruption campaigns in 
these countries also helped justify military intervention, while 
the courts similarly played a central role in either perpetuating 
and legitimating  military rule (such as in Thailand and initially 
in Pakistan) or undercutting it (as in the later stages of 
Musharraf’s rule in Pakistan). 
Finally, Part V uses the lessons learned from these 
experiences to call for a more pragmatic strategy to fight 
corruption in which those promoting anticorruption efforts are 
more openly skeptical of the military’s claims of being an 
anticorruption savior. It argues that these anticorruption 
advocates should adopt a more politically savvy strategy that 
better takes into account local context. Such a strategy would 
include reforms focused on institutions, processes, democratic 
elections, and consistent prosecution of low-level actors. An 
anticorruption model along these lines would be less likely to 
inadvertently empower the military and undermine democracy.  
I. CORRUPTION AND EMERGENCY IN BANGLADESH 
A. History of Emergencies, Corruption, and Anticorruption Efforts in 
Bangladesh 
Charges of corruption and poor governance have in many 
ways been the currency of regime change in Bangladesh. After 
gaining independence in 1971, the country held its first 
democratic elections in 1973. 18  The fledgling democratic 
government led by the charismatic leader Sheikh Mujibur 
Rahman faced serious internal challenges from military and 
                                                                                                             
17. This is arguably a variation of the emergency powers paradox pointed out by 
legal scholar Victor Ramraj, where these powers are “seen as necessary to establish the 
conditions of relative stability needed for legal, political and economic reforms to take 
hold, and yet a propensity to invoke these powers . . . casts doubt on a government’s 
commitment to constitutionalism in the first place.” Victor V. Ramraj, The Emergency 
Powers Paradox, in EMERGENCY POWERS IN ASIA: EXPLORING THE LIMITS OF LEGALITY 29 
(Victor V. Ramraj & Arun K. Thiruvengadam eds., 2010). 
18. TALUKDER MANIRUZZAMAN, THE BANGLADESH REVOLUTION AND ITS 
AFTERMATH 149 (2003). 
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political factions.19 At least partly in response to the alarming 
deterioration in the law and order situation, Sheikh Mujib 
declared the first state of emergency in independent Bangladesh 
in 1974. 20  In August 1975, members of the armed forces 
assassinated Sheikh Mujib, his family members, and key 
supporters, citing corruption and misrule to justify their 
takeover.21 
In the wake of Sheikh Mujib’s death, the country lurched 
through a series of coups and countercoups22 that lasted until 
Major General Ziaur Rahman, the former Chief Martial Law 
Administrator, took over as President of Bangladesh in 1977.23 
While General Ziaur Rahman made some progress towards 
restoring civilian democracy, he too was assassinated by 
renegade members of the armed forces in 1981.24 Martial law 
was imposed once more after General H.M. Ershad came to 
power, overthrowing an elected, civilian-led government in a 
bloodless coup in 1982.25 General Ershad, like his predecessors, 
pointed to corruption under the previous regime as a 
justification for seizing power.26 
In the late 1980s, the two major political parties, the Awami 
League (“AL”) and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (“BNP”), 
spearheaded a mass movement for democratic government. 
Among other claims, they specifically used allegations of gross 
corruption by General Ershad and his government to rally the 
country.27 After General Ershad was deposed and the first round 
of democratic elections was held in 1991, Ershad became the 
                                                                                                             
19. Id. 
20. LAWRENCE ZIRING, BANGLADESH: FROM MUJIB TO ERSHAD; AN 
INTERPRETIVE STUDY 101 (1993). 
21. MANIRUZZAMAN, supra note 18, at 175. 
22. Id. at 177–80, 191–93 (describing the series of coups and conspiracies from 
various factions as General Ziaur Rahman began to consolidate power). 
23. Id. at 204–05. 
24. ZIRING, supra note 20, at 141. 
25. Id. at 153. 
26. See id., at 154 (“Ershad . . . stressed the need to install honest government, and 
a purge of former ministers and bureaucrats produced a number of trials in which the 
accused were charged and found guilty of using their offices for private gain.”). 
27. Id. at 165 (“The principal criticism directed at President Ershad centred on 
the issue of corruption.”). 
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first major political figure in Bangladeshi history to be convicted 
and serve jail time for corrupt dealings.28 
Countervailing allegations of corruption by political party 
leaders at national and local levels became commonplace in the 
democratic environment after 1991. Such accusations by both 
parties rose to a crescendo each time elections drew nearer in 
1996, 2001, and finally 2007. Transparency International ranked 
Bangladesh as either the most corrupt or tied for the most 
corrupt country in the world from 2001 to 2005, and the 
European Union and United States have consistently demanded 
the country do more to combat corruption.29 
In light of both domestic and international pressure, the 
BNP-ruled government created the Anti-Corruption 
Commission (“ACC”) in 2004 to replace the Bureau of Anti-
Corruption, which was founded in 1957 under the government 
of Pakistan and had helped sustain several rounds of 
dictatorship.30 Yet, from its beginning the new ACC seemed 
                                                                                                             
28. See Govt Can Now Confiscate Janata Tower Property, DAILY STAR (Bangl.), Nov. 13, 
2008, at 1. 
29. See TRANSPARENCY INT’L, ANNUAL REPORT 2005, at 17 (2005), available at 
http://www.transparency.org/publications/publications/annual_reports/annual_
report_2005 (follow the hyperlink for the language of your choice under “download in 
PDF”); TRANSPARENCY INT’L, ANNUAL REPORT 2004, at 9 (2004), available at 
http://www.transparency.org/publications/publications/annual_reports/annual_
report_2004 (follow the “English” hyperlink under “download in PDF”); 
TRANSPARENCY INT’L, ANNUAL REPORT 2003, at 21 (2003), available at 
http://www.transparency.org/publications/publications/annual_reports/
annual_report_2003 (follow the hyperlink for the language of your choice under 
“download in PDF”); TRANSPARENCY INT’L, ANNUAL REPORT 2002, at 16 (2002), 
available at http://www.transparency.org/publications/publications/annual_reports/
annual_report_2002 (follow the hyperlink for the language of your choice under 
“download in PDF”); TRANSPARENCY INT’L, ANNUAL REPORT 2001, at 13 (2001), 
available at http://www.transparency.org/publications/publications/annual_reports/
annual_report_2001 (follow the “English” hyperlink under “download in PDF”); 
Interview with Iftekhar Zaman, Exec. Dir., Transparency Int’l (Mar. 18, 2009) (on file 
with authors). 
30. See Editorial, Anti-Graft Commission at Last, DAILY STAR (Bangl.), Nov. 23, 2004, 
http://www.thedailystar.net/ 2004/ 11/ 23/ d41123020127.htm; Free Anti-Graft Body Bill 
Passed After Change, DAILY STAR (Bangl.), Feb. 18, 2004, at 1, available at 
http://www.lcgbangladesh.org/corruption/newslinks/The%20Daily%20Star%20Web%
20Edition%20Vol_%204%20Num%20259.htm; Moin Ghani, A Toothless Tiger in the 
Making?, DAILY STAR (Bangl.), Sept. 21, 2003, http://www.thedailystar.net/law/
200309/03/update.htm; Muhammad Nurul Huda, Editorial, The Inaction at ACC and 
the Needful, DAILY STAR (Bangl.), Feb. 28, 2006, http://thedailystar.net/2006/
02/28/d60228020323.htm (stating that the Bureau of Anti-Corruption (“BAC”) 
functioned under the jurisdiction of the Prime Minister’s Office and “virtually did the 
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doomed to be as ineffective at fighting corruption as its 
predecessor.31 Although the ACC’s commissioners were selected 
through a supposedly nonpartisan panel, the three 
commissioners chosen to head the ACC were known as BNP 
loyalists. 32  Further, the ACC’s rules of procedure and 
organization were required to be approved by the executive, 
which engaged in frequent showdowns with the ACC. 33  By 
August 2005, thousands of cases were stalled as the ACC faced 
virtual paralysis.34 Former Law Minister Abdul Matin Khasru 
                                                                                                             
latter’s bidding and served as a mere showpiece of an anticorruption body”); Interview 
with Fida Kamal, Att’y Gen., Bangl. (Mar. 16, 2009) (on file with authors). 
31. A former Director General of the BAC, M.A. Matin, declared later that: “It was 
impossible for us to work beyond influence since we were dependent on the 
government.” Matin also identified blatant political interference, sham investigations 
by the executive branch, and dilatory stay orders from the High Court as several key 
problems with the BAC. Govt Interference Led to BAC Failure, DAILY STAR (Bangl.), 
Nov. 29, 2004, at 1. 
32. See Zayadul Ahsan, How Free Would New Graft Body Be?, DAILY STAR (Bangl.), 
Nov. 23, 2004, at 1, available at http://www.thedailystar.net/2004/11/23/
d4112301044.htm (stating that some Anti-Corruption Commission (“ACC”) members 
either enjoyed direct ties with the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (“BNP”) leadership or 
had been previously appointed to various important posts under the BNP 
government). 
33. The key weaknesses of the ACC statute of 2004 lay in Articles 34 and 36. The 
statute empowered the ACC to formulate rules of internal organization and procedure. 
As a statutory public authority, it was expected to elaborate and formulate rules of 
procedure and organization under the original mandate of the statute in order to 
ensure functionality and efficiency of the organization. Unlike other “independent” 
public institutions, however, the ACC was required to seek final approval of these rules 
from the executive branch. Indeed, the executive branch canceled the commissioners’ 
choices for general secretary and director of the ACC. See Zayadul Ahsan & Julfikar Ali 
Manik, Govt, ACC at Loggerheads, DAILY STAR (Bangl.), Jan. 4, 2005, at 1; see also Anti-
Corruption Commission Act of 2004, arts. 34, 36 (Bangl.) [hereinafter ACC Act]. 
Article 34 states: “Power to Formulate Rules—In order to fulfil [sic] the aims and 
objectives of this law, the commission may, subject to the prior approval of the 
President and through a notification in the official gazette, frame rules and 
regulations.” ACC Act, supra, art. 34. Article 36 provides:  
Power of the Government to Resolve Difficulties—If a situation arises where it 
is difficult to apply and execute this law because of vagueness about the 
powers and responsibilities of the commission under it, the government will 
explain and clarify the matter and give the commission directives and 
guidelines about what is to be done through an official gazette notification 
and in accordance with other rules and regulations.). 
ACC Act, supra, art. 36. An English translation is available at http://unpan1.un.org/
intradoc/groups/public/documents/APCITY/UNPAN019089.pdf. 
34. See Abdullah A. Dewan, Corruption, Media and Performance Based Budgeting, 
DAILY STAR (Bangl.), Sept. 15, 2005, http://www.thedailystar.net/2005/09/15/
d509151501108.htm. 
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alleged that the poor design was in fact intentional, stating: 
“The government has tied the hands of the commission by 
forming contradictory and faulty laws to keep it under 
control.”35 
B. Prelude to Emergency: Failure of the Caretaker Regime Process 
It was not just the newly created ACC that failed to make a 
clean break from the destructive politicization and 
ineffectiveness that marred its predecessor’s past. Bangladesh’s 
unique caretaker system, designed to impartially govern the 
country during elections, became ensconced in the very 
intraparty fights it was created to avoid, eventually leading to a 
military takeover in 2007. 
Bangladesh’s caretaker system is essentially a symbol of the 
distrust between the two major political parties. After the 
transition from military-backed rule in 1991, allegations of 
corruption and vote-rigging overshadowed the electoral process 
in Bangladesh.36 As a result, during the initial tenure of the 
newly elected BNP-led government, the primary opposition 
party, the AL, began to agitate for a new election system.37 In 
March 1996, after months of crippling impasse, brutal political 
violence, and a botched election, the BNP government agreed 
to amend the Constitution to create a caretaker system.38 Under 
this system, the party in power relinquishes government 
administration to a group of advisers led by the most recently 
retired Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.39 It is essentially a 
shadow administration of presumably neutral prominent citizens 
and qualified technocrats from various fields chosen in 
consultation with the major political parties. This government’s 
purpose is to impartially govern the country for up to ninety 
                                                                                                             
35. ACC Lacks Transparency Completely, DAILY STAR (Bangl.), Sept. 18, 2006, at 1.  
36. See MD. ABDUL HALIM, CONSTITUTION, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND POLITICS: 
BANGLADESH PERSPECTIVE 394–95 (1998). 
37. See id. 
38. See id. at 395–96 (describing the buildup to the creation of the Thirteenth 
Amendment to the Bangladeshi Constitution, which established the caretaker system). 
39. See id. at 397. 
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days after the dissolution of Parliament and assist the Election 
Commission in holding a free, fair, and credible election.40 
Two elections in which the two major political parties 
alternated power were successfully held under this innovative 
system, with the AL winning in 1996 and the BNP returning to 
power in 2001.41 The system, however, came under serious attack 
in the months leading up to the scheduled election of 2007. The 
AL accused the BNP of manipulating the rules regarding the 
age of retirement in order to appoint a partisan Justice as the 
Chief Adviser to the caretaker government.42 As a result of this 
disagreement, the country was plunged into violence 
orchestrated by the major political parties.43 Approximately sixty-
three people, mostly political party activists and local leaders, 
were killed in street fights and targeted assassinations in just 
twenty days. 44  Nonetheless, the BNP-appointed president of 
Bangladesh, Iajuddin Ahmed, took over the position of Chief 
Adviser and formed a caretaker government on October 29, 
2006.45 
The AL expressed its immediate suspicion of the 
president’s motives and the situation progressively worsened as 
the constitutionally mandated ninety-day deadline to hold 
elections in January drew nearer.46 On January 3, 2007, the AL 
withdrew from the scheduled election, citing lack of confidence 
in the impartiality of the caretaker regime and a flawed voter 
list, and threatening violence against any individual who 
participated in the election. 47  Observers worried that the 
country was headed towards civil war.48 
                                                                                                             
40. See id. at 399; A.K.M. Masudul Haque, Emergency Powers and Caretaker 
Government in Bangladesh, 1 J. AUSTRALASIAN L. TCHRS. ASS’N 81, 84 (2008). 
41. See Haque, supra note 40, at 85. 
42. Sabir Mustafa, Bangladesh: An Emergency Foretold, BBC NEWS, Jan. 11, 2007, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6253889.stm. 
43. Id. 
44. See generally Press Release, Nasiruddin Elan, Odhikar, 63 Persons Killed Due to 
Political Violence in Last 20 Days, from Oct 27 to Nov 15, 2006 (Nov. 16, 2006), 
available at http://www.odhikar.org/pr/pdf/pr_political_killing_nov_16_2006.pdf. 
45. See Shakhawat Liton, President Sworn in as Chief of Caretaker Govt, DAILY STAR 
(Bangl.), Oct. 30, 2006, at 1. 
46. See Mustafa, supra note 42. 
47. See Grand Alliance to Form Vote Resistance Committees, DAILY STAR (Bangl.), Jan. 9, 
2007, at 1, available at http://www.thedailystar.net/2007/01/09/d7010901107.htm. 
48. See Hasina Declares Tougher Actions, DAILY STAR (Bangl.), Jan. 11, 2007, at 1. 
Sheikh Hasina, the leader of the Awami League (“AL”), alleged that the caretaker 
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On January 11, as both parties geared up for what seemed 
likely to be a bloody, nationwide showdown on the scheduled 
election day, a military-backed midnight coup forced President 
Iajuddin Ahmed to declare the Emergency and resign from the 
Office of Chief Adviser.49  The next day, with the military’s 
support, former World Bank economist Dr. Fakhruddin Ahmed 
assumed the position as the new chief adviser to the caretaker 
government.50 
C. The Declaration of Emergency and the Anticorruption Agenda 
The scourge of corruption was presented as a key 
motivation of the new government from its very inception and 
the military argued it was uniquely situated to rise above and 
combat this scourge. Although under the Constitution a 
caretaker government is only charged with routine government 
functions and the execution of a fair election, Dr. Fakhruddin 
Ahmed interpreted his mandate as a license to eradicate 
corruption and criminality from politics, which he saw as the 
root cause of the derailment of democracy in Bangladesh.51 He 
identified corruption as a key impediment to democracy in his 
first speech to the nation and vowed to reconstitute a truly 
independent and activist ACC.52  
                                                                                                             
government was in fact being controlled by the BNP and said that “none should get 
involved in the one-sided election just to become enemy of the people.” The BNP, on 
the other hand, insisted that the elections must be held on January 22 to fulfill the 
ninety-day deadline stipulated by the Constitution. Id. 
49. See Shakhawat Liton, Fakhruddin New CA, DAILY STAR (Bangl.), Jan. 13, 2007, 
at 1.  
50. See Jalal Alamgir, Bangladesh’s Fresh Start, 20 J. DEMOCRACY 41, 49 (2009) 
(stating that although it was difficult to determine the regime’s exact dynamics, 
“[g]enerally, it appeared that the hard-line [National Coordination Committee on 
Corruption and Serious Crime (“NCC”)] and [Directorate General of Forces 
Intelligence (“DGFI”)] were in charge of political decisions; the ACC was in charge of 
legally prosecuting those identified by the NCC and DGFI; the civilian authority ran the 
technocratic aspects of governance, including economic policy; and legislation was 
prepared by those groups and given to President Ahmed to sign in the form of 
executive ordinances”); Liton, supra note 45. 
51. See CA Vows to Transfer Power Through Polls at Earliest, DAILY STAR (Bangl.), Jan. 
22, 2007, at 1. Dr. Fakhruddin Ahmed's agenda also included reconstituting the 
Election Commission, implementing a voter identification card scheme, eradicating 
the influence of black money and criminals in elections, encouraging honest 
candidates to run for political office, and promoting the independence of the judiciary. 
See id. 
52. See id. 
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The military also made its support for an anticorruption 
drive firmly known. In a major speech during the Emergency 
period, Army Chief Moeen U. Ahmed envisioned a political 
system with new players instead of the corrupt leadership of the 
past.  The Army Chief viewed the anticorruption agenda as key 
to achieving the regime’s goals, stating that: 
The roadmap to democracy lies, I presume, with objectives 
as envisioned by the government through anti-corruption 
drive and reform packages, within [an] affordable time 
frame that will steer the country away from escapism and 
build [a] strong foundation of validity on democracy . . . . 
We do not want to go back to an “elective democracy” 
where corruption in society becomes all pervasive, 
governance suffers in terms of insecurity and violation of 
rights, and where political “criminalisation” threatens the 
very survival and integrity of the state.53 
This thinly veiled threat against civilian politicians foreshadowed 
the military-backed government’s “minus-two” strategy,54 which 
aimed to send the leaders of the two major political parties—
Sheikh Hasina of the AL and Khaleda Zia of the BNP—into 
exile, replacing them with new pliant leadership.55 
Civil society generally applauded the takeover and the 
choice of Fakhruddin Ahmed as the chief adviser, and there was 
initial widespread popular support of the anticorruption drive 
initiated by the military-backed government.56 The editor of the 
most popular vernacular newspaper, Prothom Alo, expressed a 
degree of relief with regards to the coup, stating that: “While the 
country was advancing towards a civil war like situation following 
confrontations and bloodshed due to the two political alliances 
locking horns, the armed forces successfully took some steps to 
rein in the situation.”57 
                                                                                                             
53. Bangladesh to Have Own Brand of Democracy, DAILY STAR (Bangl.), Apr. 3, 2007, 
at 1 (quoting Army Chief Moeen U. Ahmed in one of his speeches to the nation).  
54. Bangladesh: The Minus-Two Solution, ECONOMIST, Sept. 8, 2007, at 66 . 
55. INT’L CRISIS GRP., ASIA REPORT NO. 151, RESTORING DEMOCRACY IN 
BANGLADESH 20 (2008), available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/
Files/asia/south-asia/bangladesh/151_restoring_democracy_in_bangladesh.pdf 
[hereinafter ICG]. 
56. See 2008 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 14, at 2177.  
57. Top Ex-Army Men for Purge of Political Parties, DAILY STAR (Bangl.), Jan. 21, 
2007, at 1. 
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The regime also received the support of Western diplomats, 
which some claimed were instrumental in the coup,58 and the 
military-backed government leaders remained in sustained 
consultation with them throughout its tenure. 59  Western 
diplomats reportedly saw the military as “a last resort and 
necessary evil” to take on the corruption of the political parties 
and bureaucracy.60 As a result, the United Kingdom, the United 
States, and other Western countries and development agencies 
largely condoned the takeover.61 
In Bangladesh, like many developing countries, there is a 
history of perceived “good coups” in which the military moves in 
to stabilize a political order that is seen to have been 
mismanaged by the political parties. The 2007 coup, at least 
initially, fit into this broader narrative. 
                                                                                                             
58. See ICG, supra note 55, at 7.  
59. See, e.g., Alamgir, supra note 50, at 48 (highlighting that “negotiations over the 
military’s role were conducted with Western diplomats, not with representatives from 
either political party”); Army Pressed for Nat’l Unity Govt, DAILY STAR (Bangl.), Sept. 18, 
2011, at 1 (detailing discussions between the military-backed government and the 
United States in which Bangladeshi military officers expressed to US diplomats their 
preference for the next consensus leader for a national unity government); Diplomats 
Hope Election Will Be Held Soon, DAILY STAR (Bangl.), Jan. 23, 2007, at 1, available at 
http://www.thedailystar.net/2007/01/23/d7012301096.htm (discussing how envoys 
from France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States met with the 
Bangladeshi foreign affairs adviser to discuss the regime's plans); Caretaker Govt Steps 
into Second Year Today, DAILY STAR (Bangl.), Jan. 12, 2008, http://www.thedailystar.net/
newDesign/print_news.php?nid=18898 (describing how Bangladesh’s “development 
partners,” including the European Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States, 
were “keeping close watch on the evolving situation ahead of the general elections”); 
Foreign Adviser Updates Envoys on Govt Action, DAILY STAR (Bangl.), Jan. 16, 2008, 
http://www.thedailystar.net/newDesign/print_news.php?nid=19439 (noting how the 
Bangladesh foreign affairs adviser briefed foreign officials on “the government’s 
actions over the past year and outlined challenges the government may face” in 2008). 
60. ICG, supra note 55, at 9. A senior diplomat commented that some colleagues 
saw the army’s intervention as “the only way to protect our development investments. 
We were getting robbed by both the Awami League and BNP-Jamaat governments.” Id. 
61. See id. at 7. 
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D. The Drive Against Corruption 
1. Nature of the Emergency Regime 
After taking power, the military-backed government quickly 
passed the Emergency Powers Ordinance (“EPO”) 62  and 
Emergency Power Rules (“EPR”).63 These promulgations laid 
out the ground rules of the regime and gave it the tools to 
pursue a zealous anticorruption agenda aimed at removing the 
extant political class from the helm of the state. Fundamental 
rights were immediately suspended under the EPR including the 
freedoms of speech, movement, assembly, and association.64 The 
EPR allowed for arrests without warrants, the use of force to 
execute government orders, and the detainment of any person 
indefinitely without charges, no right to bail, and specific 
provisions on the prosecution of corruption. 65  Subsequent 
amendments to the EPR also allowed the government or the 
ACC to withdraw any case for trial under a Special Judges’ Court 
with territorial jurisdiction over all of Bangladesh and the power 
to try any violations of the EPR.66 
These sweeping rules gave the army and the caretaker 
regime unprecedented authority to detain and try citizens on 
potentially unverified charges.67 The trials, often prosecuted by 
the ACC, took place in closed courtrooms, labeled as 
“kangaroo” courts by opponents,68 beyond the purview of the 
                                                                                                             
62. Emergency Powers Ordinance (Ordinance No. 1/2007) (Bangl.) [hereinafter 
EPO]. An English translation of this law is available at http://www.adh-geneva.ch/
RULAC/pdf_state/Emergency-Power-Ordinance-2007.pdf.  
63. Emergency Powers Rules (S.R.O. No. 15-Ain/2007) (Bangl.) [hereinafter 
EPR]. An English translation of this law is available at http://www.adh-geneva.ch/
RULAC/pdf_state/Emergency-power-rules-2007.pdf. See Rules Promulgated to Curb 
Political Activity, DAILY STAR (Bangl.), Jan. 27, 2007, at 1, available at 
http://www.thedailystar.net/2007/01/27/d7012701011.htm.   
64. EPR, supra note 63, r. 3, 5–6; see Haque, supra note 40, at 88. 
65. EPR, supra note 63, r. 10, 15–16, 19(d); see Haque, supra note 40, at 89. 
66. See Haque, supra note 40, at 89. The Special Courts were required to complete 
trials and sentencing within forty-five days of the trial’s commencement (and there was 
a possible extension of thirty additional days in cases of unforeseeable events). See id. at 
90. 
67. See id. 
68. See Interview with Mohiuddin Khan Alamgir, Ph.D., prominent politician, 
Awami League (Mar. 19, 2009) (on file with authors). 
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press or the general public.69 One scholar concluded: “The EPR 
and the EPO, by suspending the safeguards from arrest and 
detention, effectively legalise arbitrary arrests and detention. 
The [implication] . . . [is] that everyone is subject to the risk of 
endless detention without any legal avenues of redress.”70 
2. The Anticorruption Agenda: Tool for Change 
The government’s ambitious anticorruption campaign was 
used as a tool to reconfigure the political landscape of 
Bangladesh. This agenda was publicized and executed from the 
regime’s very inception in a manner that suggested a significant 
degree of preplanning and coordination. 
Immediately after the declaration of emergency in early 
2007, the military-backed regime began its crackdown on many 
top politicians, some of whom were commonly viewed as corrupt 
and who may have been connected with criminal networks 
through which they facilitated violence and extortion. 71  By 
January 19, merely a week into the new regime, nearly 2000 
people, mostly low-level party activists, were in police custody, 
while arrest warrants were issued for approximately another 
1000.72 Political activists at the district level were directed to go 
into hiding by the central leadership of the major political 
parties.73 
On February 1, 2007, the ACC initiated an investigation 
against two major political players—the former communications 
minister and the business partner of Tarique Rahman (the son 
of BNP chairwoman and former Prime Minister Khaleda Zia).74 
On February 22, 2007, retired Army Chief Hasan Mashhud 
Chowdhury was installed as the chairman of the reconstituted 
ACC,75 a move that could be interpreted as a signal of the 
                                                                                                             
69. See Haque, supra note 40, at 90. The risk of endless detention was seemingly 
contrary to Article 31(3) of the Constitution that guarantees open and public trials. See 
id. at 89–90. 
70. See id. at 90. 
71. See Midnight Crackdown on “Corrupt” Politicians, DAILY STAR (Bangl.), Feb. 5, 
2007, at 1. 
72. See JCD Leaders Rounded up in Raids, DAILY STAR (Bangl.), Jan. 19, 2007, at 1. 
73. See Rakib Hasnet Suman, BNP Men Told to Avert Arrest, DAILY STAR (Bangl.), 
Jan. 20, 2007, at 1. 
74. See Mamun Arrested, DAILY STAR (Bangl.), Feb. 2, 2007, at 1. 
75. Lt Gen (rtd) Mashhud Made ACC Chief, DAILY STAR (Bangl.), Feb. 23, 2007, at 1.  
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military’s control over the anticorruption agenda. The caretaker 
government and army increasingly began to target prominent 
politicians and created lists of hundreds of high profile 
politicians, bureaucrats, and businessmen to be arrested on 
corruption and other criminal charges in the coming weeks.76 
The first high profile detainees were sent to jail on charges of 
antistate activities, sabotage, and corruption under the EPO.77 
Within the Emergency’s first few months, estimates of those 
netted in the anticorruption drive ranged from 100,000 to 
200,000, although there is little reliable data and many were 
released shortly after being arrested.78 
Amidst this anticorruption blitzkrieg, on February 5, the 
government announced that it would sign the UN Convention 
Against Corruption,79 providing additional legitimacy for its far-
reaching anticorruption activities, which were already broadly 
supported domestically, and condoned by the international 
community. 80  According to the 2009 Human Rights Watch 
Report on Bangladesh: “Several international donor agencies 
such as the Asia[n] Development Bank, United Nations 
Development Programme, and World Bank are providing 
support to the government’s anti-corruption efforts. They have 
rarely raised publicly any concerns about abuses resulting from 
the campaign.”81 For example, a US$150 million loan from the 
Asian Development Bank supported the rapid expansion of the 
ACC during the military’s rule.82 Human Rights Watch also 
reported that the international community was generally 
                                                                                                             
76. See Midnight Crackdown on “Corrupt” Politicians, supra note 71, at 1. 
77. See Caught Political Bigwigs Detained, Sent to Jail, DAILY STAR (Bangl.), Feb. 6, 
2007, at 1 (noting that these high profile detainees were imprisoned and charged 
under Section 16(2) of the 2007 Emergency Powers Ordinance).  
78. See ICG, supra note 55, at 17; Wadood Bhuiyan’s Brother Among 1,449 Held, DAILY 
STAR (Bangl.), Feb. 16, 2007, at 1. On March 7, Tarique Rahman, the son of the former 
Prime Minister and leader of the BNP, Khaleda Zia, was detained by the joint forces on 
a midnight raid and charged with extortion the next day. See Tarique Remanded in 
Extortion Case, DAILY STAR (Bangl.), Mar. 9, 2007, at 1. 
79. United Nations Convention Against Corruption, Oct. 31, 2003, 2349 U.N.T.S. 
41.  
80. See id.; Dhaka to Sign Anti-Graft UN Convention, DAILY STAR (Bangl.), Feb. 6, 
2007, at 1. 
81. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2009, at 221 (2009), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/world-report/2009/bangladesh. 
82. Good Governance Program: Bangladesh, ASIAN DEV. BANK, http://pid.adb.org/
pid/LoanView.htm?projNo=37017&seqNo=01&typeCd=3 (last visited Feb. 10, 2012). 
754 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 35:737 
supportive of the military-backed regime, as “no international 
actors publicly called on the army to return full powers to a 
civilian government.”83 Transparency International also worked 
closely with the military-backed government as an advisor on its 
anticorruption efforts, hoping to make the most of what it saw as 
a potential opportunity to strengthen anticorruption institutions 
during the Emergency.84 
Among those arrested by the military-backed government 
were local government officials brought in on dubious 
corruption charges.85 These officials were then replaced with 
individuals reportedly loyal to the military. 86  Prominent 
journalists and activists also were frequently arrested or 
intimidated with the prospect of arrest.87 The military seemed to 
use corruption charges to both solidify its power and stifle 
dissent as it attempted to remake the Bangladeshi political 
order. 
Central to that reformulation agenda was its “minus-two” 
strategy to send into exile former Prime Ministers Sheikh Hasina 
and Khaleda Zia, the respective leaders of the AL and BNP. This 
plan failed, however, as the army underestimated their political 
support and encountered international resistance.88 In response, 
the regime arrested Sheikh Hasina on July 16, 2007, on charges 
of extorting 30,000,000 taka (about US$500,000) 89  and on 
September 3, it arrested Khaleda Zia on various charges of 
graft.90 As one official reportedly commented: “[W]e gave them 
the easy way out, but they did not want to go. So we decided to 
                                                                                                             
83. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2008, at 245 (2008), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/wr2k8_web.pdf. 
84. See ICG, supra note 55, at 8; Interview with Iftekhar Zaman, Exec. Dir., 
Transparency Int’l (Mar. 18, 2009) (on file with authors). 
85. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 42-228PDF, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHT 
PRACTICES FOR 2007, at 2161 (2008), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/
2007/100612.htm (nonpaginated copy) [hereinafter 2007 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT].  
86. See ICG, supra note 55, at 16. 
87. See id. at 19. 
87. See Ex-Premier Hasina Returns Home, ASIANEWS.IT, May 8, 2007, 
http://www.asianews.it/news-en/Ex-premier-Hasina-returns-home-9200.html; Khaleda’s 
Exile Move Runs Out of Steam, DAILY STAR (Bangl.), Apr. 25, 2007, at 1; Sheikh Hasina 
Warrant Suspended, BBC NEWS, Apr. 23, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/
6583729.stm.  
89. See Hasina Arrested, Sent to Sub-Jail, DAILY STAR (Bangl.), July 17, 2007, at 1. 
90. See 2007 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 85, at 2168; ICG, supra note 55, at 
21.  
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make their lives so difficult in the courts that they wish they had 
gone [into exile].”91 By the time Khaleda Zia was arrested in 
September 2007, a large number of the most powerful leaders 
from the two major political parties had been arrested as well, 
generally on allegations of corruption, although many were held 
for months without formal charges.92 
Given the levels of corruption in Bangladesh, the US State 
Department described many of the ACC’s charges as “credible.” 
Still, as the military’s drive against corruption continued, 
increasing numbers of Bangladeshis and outside observers 
began to view the detention of these political and business 
leaders as politically motivated. Fueling this suspicion was the 
fact that several high-profile politicians, who were widely 
perceived as corrupt, but who had supported the caretaker 
government and the military’s intervention, were not 
prosecuted.93 
II. BLOCKED IN COURT 
Given that most of Bangladesh’s prominent political leaders 
were detained on corruption charges, the battle between the 
military and politicians came to court. There, the High Court 
Division of the Supreme Court dealt some of the first and most 
visible blows against the legitimacy of the military’s “good 
governance” coup. This confrontation between the High Court 
Division and the military hastened the end of the military’s rule. 
It is also an example of how activist militaries attempt to draw 
legitimacy from the judicial branch and thus can become 
particularly susceptible to judicial opposition in “good 
governance” coups. 
As of 2008, the Supreme Court in Bangladesh consisted of a 
sixty-seven judge High Court Division and an Appellate Division 
                                                                                                             
91. ICG, supra note 55, at 21. 
92. See 2007 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 85, at 2160, 2168.  
93. See 2008 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 14, at 2183. The US State 
Department reported that human rights organizations have estimated that by the end 
of 2007, the Bangladeshi government had detained some 200 high-ranking politicians, 
businessmen, and officials as part of its anticorruption campaign. See 2007 HUMAN 
RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 85, at 2161. 
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of seven judges.94  Judges are traditionally appointed by the 
president to the Appellate Division from the High Court 
Division in their order of seniority, but this practice has been 
ignored on a number of occasions for allegedly political 
reasons.95 
Prominent senior counsel are far more influential in 
Bangladesh and across South Asia than they often are elsewhere 
in the world. The fact that a high profile senior lawyer argues a 
case is typically thought to sway its outcome, and as a result such 
senior counsel are paid disproportionately more than other 
lawyers.96 The ACC hired many of these best-known lawyers of 
the Bangladeshi bar on retainer.97 Some critics claimed the ACC 
did this simply so they would not be available to defend 
politicians. 98  Others said lawyers were threatened into not 
representing those facing corruption charges.99 
Nevertheless, the High Court Division of the Supreme 
Court provided a constant source of aggravation to the military 
government during the Emergency, consistently offering 
limiting interpretations of the government’s emergency powers. 
On February 26, 2007, the High Court declared illegal the 
detention order against a former AL member of Parliament and 
three others.100 It observed that the powers of the High Court 
Division, which allowed it to issue directions, could not be 
curtailed by the EPR. 101  This outspoken decision was 
prominently covered in the media and was among the earliest 
and most visible challenges to the government’s claim to broad 
emergency powers to remake Bangladeshi democratic 
                                                                                                             
94. There is only one chief justice of the Supreme Court and he has the power to 
assign benches in both divisions, as well as significant power in both the appointment 
and promotion of judges. Since 2008, additional judges have been sworn in. As of 
October 2011, there are ninety-eight high court judges in Bangladesh. See Ten HC 
Judges Sworn In, DAILY STAR (Bangl.), Oct. 21, 2011, at 1. 
95. See Bangladesh: Culture of Supersession in Supreme Court Will Undermine Rule of 
Law, ASIAN HUM. RTS. COMMISSION (May 26, 2008), http://www.humanrights.asia/
news/ahrc-news/AHRC-STM-147-2008 . 
96. See Interview with Rafique-Ul Huq, Defense Attorney (Mar. 20, 2009) (on file 
with authors). 
97. See id. 
98. See id. 
99. See id. 
100. See Detention of Ex-MP Kamal Majumder Declared Illegal, DAILY STAR (Bangl.), 
Feb. 27, 2007, at 1. 
101. See id. 
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institutions. 102  As one well-known critic of the military-
government explained, it was the first time after the coup that 
the military began to “lose face.”103 
Throughout the Emergency, the decisions of the High 
Court Division provided a rallying point for those who opposed 
the military government’s attempts to use the crisis to 
restructure or “cleanse” Bangladeshi politics. These decisions 
carried great symbolic weight. Declaring the government’s 
actions illegal significantly undercut the military’s claims that its 
intervention was necessary to promote “good governance.” For 
most of the Emergency, however, these judgments usually 
remained merely symbolic, as the Supreme Court’s Appellate 
Division stayed or overruled the High Court Division’s most 
assertive decisions. 
A. Showdown on Bail 
The EPR barred “any court or tribunal” from granting bail 
to those accused or being investigated of offenses under the EPR 
or certain statutes. 104  Government counsel argued these 
provisions should be upheld and bail should be denied because 
the accused might intimidate witnesses, tamper with evidence, 
or flee the country.105 With so many leading politicians in jail 
charged with or awaiting charges of corruption, the no-bail 
provision took on pivotal political significance. If these 
individuals could be kept confined and preoccupied with legal 
cases, the military-backed government would have a freer hand 
in remaking Bangladeshi politics. 
The bar on seeking bail under the EPR was immediately 
challenged in the Supreme Court and the Chief Justice referred 
                                                                                                             
102. See Interview with Nazmul Ahsan Kalimullah, Ph.D., Chairman, Dep’t of Pub. 
Admin., Univ. of Dhaka (Mar. 16, 2009) (on file with authors). 
103. Id. 
104. EPR, supra note 63, r. 10–11, 19D; see Ridwanul Hoque, The Recent Emergency 
and the Politics of the Judiciary in Bangladesh, 2 NUJS L. REV. 183, 194 (2009) (explaining 
that “notwithstanding the general legal provision concerning bail, no application for 
bail can be made to ‘any court or tribunal’ by a person against whom an inquiry, 
investigation, or trial is pending concerning an offence under the [emergency power 
rule] or certain [emergency power rule]-covered statutes” (footnotes omitted)); see also 
Haque, supra note 40, at 89 (explaining how after its initial promulgation, the 
Emergency Powers Rules were amended to expand government’s powers). 
105. See Interview with Fida Kamal, supra note 30. 
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the case to a high court division criminal bench consisting of 
Justices Nozrul Islam Chowdhury and Emdadul Haque.106 On 
April 22, 2007, the bench granted bail to Moyezuddin Sikder, a 
businessman charged with colluding to create an artificial fuel 
scarcity. 107  Although the government argued that the EPR 
removed the court’s jurisdiction to hear the case, the justices 
declared that the term “any court or tribunal” in the rules was 
not meant to include the Supreme Court.108 
The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, however, 
stayed the High Court Division’s decision on May 24, 2007.109 
Thus began a pattern where over the ensuing months, the High 
Court Division would grant bail to politicians who had been 
jailed on corruption charges, including prominent leaders like 
Khaleda Zia, only to quickly have the Appellate Division stay 
most of these orders.110  
A year later on April 23, 2008, the Appellate Division 
formally overturned the High Court Division in State v. 
Moyezuddin Sikder and unanimously found that the EPR was 
intended to remove the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction for these 
bail matters.111 Further, it reprimanded the High Court Division 
for writing “lengthy judgments” that embarked upon 
“[c]onstitutional questions” in deciding bail petitions.112 
This decision by the Appellate Division did not give the 
executive an entirely free hand. It declared that if an order was 
without jurisdiction, coram non judice, or if the allegations were 
                                                                                                             
106. HC to Consider Bail Petitions, DAILY STAR (Bangl.), Apr. 23, 2007, at 1. 
107. See State v. Moyezuddin Sikder, (2008) 60 DLR (AD) 82 (Bangl.). 
108. Hoque, supra note 104, at 194. 
109. AIN O SALISH KENDRA, HUMAN RIGHTS IN BANGLADESH 2008, at 16 (Sara 
Hossain ed.), available at http://www.askbd.org/web/?page_id=430; HC Grants Bail to 
Hasina, Stays Power Plant Graft Case, DAILY STAR (Bangl.), Nov. 5, 2007, at 1; Khaleda 
Granted Bail: Proceedings Stayed, DAILY STAR (Bangl.), Oct. 1, 2007, at 1; SC Extends Stay 
on Hasina’s Bail, DAILY STAR (Bangl.), Aug. 17, 2007, at 1; SC Stays Hasina’s Bail Order, 
DAILY STAR (Bangl.), Aug. 3, 2007, at 1.  
110. See The Trial of Sheikh Hasina: International Community Fails to Ensure Due 
Process, ACHR WKLY. REV.–ASIAN CTR. FOR HUM. RTS. (Mar. 27, 2008), 
http://www.achrweb.org/Review/2008/211-08.html. 
111. Moyezuddin Sikder, (2008) 60 DLR (AD) 82 (Bangl.). To justify denying bail, 
the Appellate Division relied on Bangladeshi Supreme Court precedent decisions from 
the Privy Council during colonial India and on Pakistani Supreme Court rulings. It also 
cited to Solicitor, Government of Bangladesh v. Syed Sanwar. See Moyezuddin Sikder, 60 DLR 
(AD) at 86–87. 
112. Id. at 89–90. 
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made in bad faith, the High Court Division may grant bail, but 
found that these arguments were not made in the Moyezuddin 
Sikder case.113 If the Appellate Division provided a window to 
challenge the EPR’s bail provisions in this decision, it did not 
seem like a victory to many. A former president of the 
Bangladesh Bar Association called the decision a “black 
chapter” in the history of the Bangladesh judiciary.114 
The Moyezuddin Sikder case was not the only time the High 
Court Division and Appellate Division clashed over the 
Emergency Powers Rules. Most of the cases the ACC brought 
during the Emergency were based on alleged acts of corruption 
that predated both the Emergency and the promulgation of the 
EPR. Defense lawyers for Sheikh Hasina, in a case implicating 
her for extortion, argued that applying the EPR’s strict 
procedural constraints—including the bail provisions—to try 
alleged pre-Emergency crimes was tantamount to ex post facto 
legislation.115 
In February 2008, the High Court Division agreed. Justices 
Shah Abu Nayeem Mominur Rahman and Shahidul Islam ruled 
that applying the EPR to the corruption cases against Sheikh 
Hasina was retrospective and unconstitutional, meaning she 
could not be barred from seeking bail.116 In pointed language, 
the court went on to further hold that curbing the right to bail 
violated the fundamental rights of the Constitution. 117  It 
concluded that the “Emergency has not curtailed the power and 
authority of . . . the [c]ourt.”118 
Subsequently, the Appellate Division stymied the High 
Court Division’s stand against the government once again. In 
May 2008, a month after overruling the High Court in 
Moyezuddin Sikder, the Appellate Division found that the EPR did 
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(Bangl.), Apr. 24, 2008, http://www.thefinancialexpress-bd.com/ more.php?news_id=
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115. See Bangladesh v. Sheikh Hasina, (2008) 60 DLR (AD) 90, 99 (Bangl.). 
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196. 
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not act as an ex post facto law nor did it violate the fundamental 
rights of the Constitution.119  
Being overturned was not the only setback to judges on the 
High Court Division who wanted to take a more aggressive 
stance against executive power under the Emergency. 120  In 
March 2008, the chief justice moved Justice Rahman and Justice 
Islam, who had granted bail to Sheikh Hasina and a number of 
other prominent politicians, to a civil bench where they would 
no longer hear bail applications.121 The court said this move was 
a routine reallocation of benches, while human rights activists 
argued their transfer was punishment for these justices’ 
outspoken assertiveness during the Emergency.122  
Justices on the High Court Division voiced their frustration 
with the powerlessness they felt at continuing to be overruled by 
the Appellate Division.123 Justice Nozrul Islam Chowdhury, who 
had granted the original request for bail for Moyezuddin Sikder, 
reportedly told a lawyer requesting bail for his client in May 
2008 that he should seek bail with Allah instead.124 He lamented: 
“We cannot go by the oath we took under the Constitution. 
[This] is a Court within brackets.”125 
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The far greater willingness of the High Court Division to 
challenge the government than the Appellate Division is both 
striking and somewhat mysterious. Some have suggested that 
this difference was simply the result of different personalities of 
the judges.126 Meanwhile, law professor Ridwanul Hoque has 
argued that perhaps because the High Court Division justices 
knew they could be later overruled, they attempted to test the 
waters and assert their judicial powers more strongly against the 
executive.127 Another theory is that the executive was simply less 
successful at capturing the opinion of the lower levels of the 
judiciary than in the Appellate Division.128  
The Bangladeshi experience of having the High Court 
Division more spiritedly protect encroachments by the executive 
during an emergency is not without precedent in the region. In 
India, during the 1975–1977 emergency, several High Courts 
found that detainees could appeal to the court for release even 
if they were barred under the emergency from moving the court 
to enforce the rights to life and personal liberty.129 This safety 
valve was later blocked by the Supreme Court in Jabalpur v. 
                                                                                                             
126. See Interview with Mahtab Haider, Shameran Abed & Shahiduzzaman, Staff 
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128. See SURYA SREENIVASAN, JUDICIAL RESPONSES TO EMERGENCY: A COMPARATIVE 
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the military-backed interim government influenced any of the Appellate Division 
judges or, alternatively, whether the High Court Division may have been pressured by 
the political parties to support their leaders. See id. at 12. 
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High Courts refused to countenance the monstrous doctrine that a détenu could not 
secure his release from preventive detention by an application for habeas corpus even 
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order or an order based on irrelevant considerations.”). 
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Shukla,130 which effectively allowed detainees to be stripped of 
habeas corpus rights.131 
Two examples do not make a pattern, but the similarities of 
the situations in India and Bangladesh may indicate, somewhat 
counterintuitively, that apex courts could be less willing to 
challenge executive emergency powers than subordinate courts. 
This phenomenon needs to be better understood if courts are to 
be seen as a meaningful check on militaries during states of 
emergency. 
B. The Tide Turns 
During early and mid-2008, against the backdrop of 
continued pushback by the courts, the military-backed interim 
government came under increasing domestic and international 
pressure to hold elections, which it ultimately scheduled for 
December 2008.132 By this point, the interim government had 
failed to actualize its plan to remake Bangladesh’s political 
parties. Now it was faced with a situation in which the country’s 
leading politicians were in jail in the run-up to the elections. It 
was this change in political circumstances that ultimately led to 
the release of the hundreds of politicians charged with 
corruption and other offenses under the EPR. 
As negotiations between the military and political parties 
continued, politicians started being released from jail.133 The 
ACC had rushed to prosecute so many so fast it had often not 
followed all the required procedures and defendants used these 
irregularities to their advantage. 134  Dozens of high profile 
politicians were released on bail by the High Court Division in 
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July and August of 2008.135 By the end of August, the media 
reported that on a single day, bail was being granted in a 
different case every sixty-three seconds. 136  Khaleda Zia was 
released on September 11, 2008.137 Sheikh Hasina, who had 
been allowed to go to the United States on medical grounds in 
June 2008, returned to the country on November 6, 2008, to 
contest the December elections.138 
It was widely believed that bail petitions were allowed to go 
forward in 2008 on political grounds because the legal 
irregularities that were used to justify the release of various 
politicians and activists had been present for many months 
without the accused being released. 139  Furthermore, at that 
point the government did not even challenge several of the bail 
requests140 and, despite its previous directions, the Appellate 
Division did not stay any of the High Court Division orders.141 
The State of Emergency was finally lifted on December 17, 
2008, and on December 29, the AL led by Sheikh Hasina won 
230 of 299 parliamentary seats in national elections that 
independent observers considered to be generally free and 
fair.142 
III. RETURN TO DEMOCRACY AND THE EFFECT ON 
ANTICORRUPTION EFFORTS 
With the return of democracy, the ACC’s investigations 
during the Emergency-regime—regardless of their actual 
merits—were discredited as politically motivated. Most of the 
politicians and businessmen the ACC had prosecuted were 
released on bail and many had been cleared of charges on 
technicalities. The civilian politicians that took over in late 2008 
had little incentive to continue a campaign that they did not 
initiate and of which they were once the main target. Since 
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2009, the democratically elected government has moved to 
bring the ACC under its control and neutralize it altogether. In 
February 2011, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s cabinet placed a 
bill before Parliament to amend the Anti-Corruption Act so that 
the ACC would be required to receive government permission 
before filing any corruption cases against government 
officials.143 The amendments faced opposition from some ruling 
party lawmakers as well as from international donors and 
development partners and the bill was subsequently tabled in 
July 2011.144 In the meantime, the ACC has returned to its pre-
2007 form. In August 2011, it filed a new corruption case against 
former prime minister and BNP chairperson Khaleda Zia. The 
BNP has decried these charges as politically motivated and a 
sign that the AL is orchestrating the ACC’s prosecutions to 
attack political opponents.145 The ACC in Bangladesh today is 
likely as compromised and as ineffective as the commission that 
the military attempted to replace when it came to power during 
the Emergency. 
During the Emergency, Justice Abdur Rashid had warned 
that the “[d]enial of [the] rule of law in the fight against 
corruption would ultimately strengthen the climate of impunity 
in the fertility of which corruption thrives in.”146 Indeed, at the 
end of the Emergency the country now seems farther than ever 
from having institutions capable of tackling corruption. 
It is not just the ACC that has been tainted by association 
with the military-backed regime. Ridwanul Hoque writes: “There 
is no denying that particularly the senior judiciary in Bangladesh 
incurred a crisis of public confidence during the recent 
emergency” because of the Appellate Division’s perceived 
failure to stand up to the excesses of the military-backed 
government.147 The judiciary, which is seen by many as having its 
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own deep challenges with corruption,148 is now also seen as 
unable to stand up against political pressures. In other words, 
the ACC’s failed anticorruption efforts during the Emergency 
not only ended up undermining the ACC itself, but arguably the 
judiciary and its ability to contribute to anticorruption efforts in 
the future.149 
IV. IN CONTEXT: PAKISTAN AND THAILAND 
Part of what is so striking about Bangladesh’s experience is 
that it is not atypical. Many countries with politically active 
militaries have seen the military use corruption charges against 
civilian politicians as both a justification for and tool of military 
rule. Indeed, politicians’ corruption is frequently the only point 
of national agreement that the military can use to legitimize its 
rule.150 
Pakistan and Thailand provide recent examples of this 
phenomenon. In both countries, corruption charges were used 
to legitimize “good governance” coups and military rule and 
courts played a key role in legitimizing this governance. The 
Pakistani and Thai militaries sought court validation as evidence 
that they were providing better, and in many ways, more “legal 
governance” than the civilian politicians they replaced. In 
Pakistan, the courts ultimately rebelled against this role, which 
assisted in the downfall of military rule. In Thailand, judicial 
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decisions, and the judges themselves, became an integral part of 
affirming the new military-created constitutional order. 
Both cases show the central role of courts and corruption 
charges in underpinning such coups. These examples mirror 
the paradox found in Bangladesh: that anticorruption 
advocates’ agendas can be appropriated by the military for 
political interventions that not only undermine democracy but 
also frequently retard anticorruption efforts. 
A. Pakistan 
Charges of corruption and regime change have long been 
interlinked in Pakistan. General Ayub Khan, who ruled Pakistan 
from 1958–69, justified the army’s intervention as a reaction to 
the “political chicanery, intrigue, corruption, and inefficiency 
manifest in every sphere of life.”151 He painted the army as the 
only institution disciplined enough to save the nation from these 
“evils” and lay the foundation for liberal democratic 
constitutionalism.152  
Ayub Khan’s script was followed repeatedly over the 
following decades, as the Pakistani military frequently 
intervened to weed out politicians it labeled as corrupt or 
incompetent. For example, Benazir Bhutto was elected Prime 
Minister in 1988 in the first democratic election in over a 
decade, but she was removed twenty months later by President 
Ghulam Ishaq Khan amidst charges of corruption.153  Nawaz 
Sharif then became prime minister, vowing to end the 
corruption of Benazir Bhutto’s government.154 However, just 
three years later, in 1993, President Ghulam Ishaq Khan again 
dissolved the democratically elected government on charges of 
corruption, nepotism, and extrajudicial killings. 155  Benazir 
Bhutto was reelected Prime Minister later that year, only to be 
removed by President Farooq Laghari in 1996—yet again, on 
corruption charges.156 Subsequently, Nawaz Sharif returned to 
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power in 1997 with both Bhutto and Sharif trading accusations 
of corruption against each other, which ultimately led to Bhutto 
being convicted of corruption and going into self-imposed exile 
in early 1999.157 
After Sharif attempted to dismiss General Musharraf as 
chief of the army and then refused to let his plane land in 
Karachi, General Musharraf staged a successful coup in October 
1999.158 In justifying the military’s claim to power, Musharraf 
pointed to a weak economy, poor national morale, and 
“corruption of horrendous proportion,” stating that “good 
governance” was a prerequisite to solving the country’s 
problems.159 Sharif was convicted of hijacking and terrorism for 
prohibiting Musharraf’s plane from landing and was sentenced 
to life in prison. He was later granted amnesty in exchange for 
going into exile in Saudi Arabia. 160  In 2000, he was also 
convicted of corruption for failing to pay taxes on a 
helicopter. 161  When Sharif unsuccessfully tried to return in 
September 2007 to run for Parliament, the government 
reopened another corruption case against him.162 As a result, 
both Sharif and Bhutto were out of the country during the 
October 2007 presidential election, which Musharraf then easily 
won.163 
As in Bangladesh, Pakistan’s anticorruption agency became 
a tool for the military under Musharraf’s regime, with Musharraf 
filling its ranks with loyal members and the military personnel. 
High profile opposition political figures, such as Yousaf Raza 
Gilani and Asif Ali Zardari, who would later become prime 
minister and president, respectively, spent several years in jail 
during this time on corruption charges.164 
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Although Pakistani courts have occasionally protected their 
own jurisdiction and declared military coups illegal once they 
ended,165 for the most part they have acquiesced to military 
forays into civilian rule.166 During the initial years of Musharraf’s 
government the courts generally followed this pattern, rarely 
challenging the military’s actions. Indeed, most sitting judges 
took a loyalty oath to the Provisional Constitutional Order 
underpinning the Musharraf regime.167 However, several years 
into the military-backed regime, the Pakistani Supreme Court, 
and, in particular, Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry 
began to challenge the government in a series of high-profile 
cases. The court openly questioned the government’s policies 
that led to the disappearances of suspected terrorists and the 
privatization of a steel mill in which corruption was suspected.168 
It even appeared likely that the court might rule that Musharraf 
could not head the army and serve as the president at the same 
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time. In response, Musharraf leveled charges of corruption 
against the chief justice and suspended him in March 2007.169  
Lawyers from across the country rallied to the chief justice’s 
defense, sparking a nationwide movement to restore him to the 
Supreme Court. Following this movement, he was reappointed 
in July 2007.170 However, after Musharraf won reelection in 
October 2007, the Supreme Court stayed the election results 
while it investigated whether Musharraf could have run for 
office while also holding a position in the military.171 Faced with 
this direct challenge to his rule, Musharraf declared an 
emergency and dissolved the Supreme Court.172 
Under pressure from domestic groups and international 
powers, such as the United States, Musharraf passed a National 
Reconciliation Ordinance (“NRO”) 173  in October 2007 that 
granted amnesty to a substantial number of politicians and 
bureaucrats, mostly for crimes relating to corruption.174 This 
paved the way for Benazir Bhutto to return from exile to contest 
parliamentary elections.175 Some felt that Bhutto and her party 
had cut a deal with the military, providing the military a civilian 
face to oppose an increasingly popular and politically active 
judiciary. The NRO was suspended by a panel of judges 
including Chief Justice Chaudhry shortly after it was passed, but 
after Chief Justice Chaudhry’s removal for the second time it was 
revived by a panel of judges including the new Chief Justice 
Abdul Hameed Dogar.176 General elections were then held in 
February 2008, in the wake of the assassination of Pakistan 
People’s Party (“PPP”) leader Benazir Bhutto—the PPP won177 
After further agitation, Chief Justice Chaudhry and other 
dismissed Supreme Court judges were eventually reinstated in 
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March 2009.178 The popular support received eventually led to 
the judges’ reinstatement.179 In December 2009, the court under 
Chief Justice Chaudhry declared the NRO unconstitutional, 
throwing the country back into a constitutional crisis.180 
Despite justifying the military’s coup in large part on 
antigraft grounds, Pakistan’s Transparency International 
ranking actually fell during Musharraf's rule, leading some 
opposition leaders to call his tenure the most corrupt in 
Pakistani history.181 Several army officers were seen as corrupt 
but untouched by the government, while several civilian 
politicians supposedly had corruption charges dropped in 
exchange for supporting Musharraf in the 2002 elections.182 The 
PPP’s 2008 proposed impeachment charge sheet against 
President Musharraf (who resigned before it could be brought) 
included hundreds of pages of charges of misconduct, financial 
irregularities, and violations of the Constitution.183 Analysts like 
Ayesha Siddiqa have argued that Pakistani military officers have 
a strong economic motivation to stay involved in politics, where 
they can profit from military controlled businesses, land 
holdings, and official perks.184 
Pakistan’s experience clearly parallels Bangladesh’s: in both 
countries the military used corruption charges to seize power. As 
in Bangladesh, General Musharraf’s fight against corruption in 
Pakistan frequently became sidetracked by political 
opportunism that then undermined both democratic and 
corruption-fighting institutions. The judiciary in Pakistan, 
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arguably even more than in Bangladesh, ultimately checked the 
military’s claims on power as it challenged the corruption and 
poor governance under Musharraf’s regime, and helped 
instigate his departure. 
B. Thailand 
The Thai military also has a long history of using 
corruption charges both as a justification and a tool for their 
rule. As in the Bangladeshi and Pakistani cases, the Thai military 
has relied on the courts to validate its rule. Indeed, judges have 
now been made a central part of Thailand’s constitutional order 
in the military-drafted constitution, along with other “good 
governance” institutions, in order to help check the power of 
civilian politicians and political parties. 
Between the introduction of democracy in 1932 and 1992, 
Thailand experienced nineteen coups, making coups the 
primary vehicle through which Thai political leaders alternated 
in power.185 As in Bangladesh and Pakistan, poor governance 
and corruption were repeatedly invoked as reasons for these 
coups, in effect becoming the currency of transition. As Clark 
Neher notes: “By decrying civilian ineptness, corruption, and 
malfeasance, and by proclaiming threats against the nation’s 
sovereignty, military leaders were able to persuade the 
bureaucratic polity that the military could do a better job of 
governing.”186 
As was the case in Pakistan and Bangladesh, the Thai 
military’s justifications for taking over have not always been 
completely altruistic. For example, many commentators argued 
that the real reason behind the 1991 coup was that the 
government was attempting to increase civilian control over the 
military, including the military’s large budget.187 The military 
also has often been just as corrupt as the civilian government. 
General Sunthorn Kongsompong, who led the 1991 coup and its 
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antigraft drives,188 left an estate reported at around US$100 
million when he died, despite spending his entire career in 
government service.189 
The 1997 Constitution, the first to be drafted by a popularly 
elected assembly, was more democratic than its predecessors, 
allowing for direct representation in both houses of the 
bicameral assembly.190 It also created a host of independent 
agencies that were intended to fight graft, including a National 
Counter Corruption Commission (“NCCC”) that replaced 
earlier anticorruption institutions, which had proven mostly 
ineffective.191 
In 2001, Thaksin Shinawatra was elected prime minister on 
a populist platform, relying heavily on the rural vote from the 
country’s poorer North and Northeast.192 A prominent business 
tycoon, Thaksin had long been dogged by accusations of 
corruption.193 In December 2000, the NCCC indicted Thaksin 
for illegally registering his assets in the names of staff and 
business colleagues in the run-up to the 2001 election.194 The 
Constitutional Court then had to decide whether to affirm the 
NCCC’s charges, which would have banned Thaksin from 
politics. Confronted with the precarious predicament of 
whether to throw Thaksin out of office immediately after his 
party had been voted into power, it acquitted him in a 
controversial eight to seven vote.195 
Prime Minister Thaksin was subsequently accused of 
influencing the guardian institutions that the 1997 Constitution 
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had created to limit political power. For instance, he was blamed 
for using the appointment process, intimidation, and bribery to 
undercut the Constitutional Court and NCCC.196 
In early 2006, demonstrators led by the opposition party 
alliance, People’s Alliance of Democracy, went to the streets in 
Bangkok decrying what they saw as Thaksin’s often authoritarian 
and corrupt administration.197 In particular, protestors criticized 
the tax free sale of Thaksin’s US$1.9 billion telecommunications 
company and alleged that he was involved in widespread voter 
fraud. 198  To galvanize support, Thaksin called for elections. 
Other parties boycotted the election, leading Thaksin’s party to 
achieve an overwhelming victory in April 2006. As a result of the 
boycott, Thaksin announced he would step aside as prime 
minister and, in May 2006, the Constitutional Court declared 
the elections invalid.199 
In the face of continuing disagreement between the 
political parties about what to do next, the military seized power 
in September 2006 while Thaksin was visiting New York City.200 
The military justified its takeover by citing social unrest and 
corruption, stating that: “There has been social division like 
never before. Each side has been trying to conquer another with 
all possible means and the situation tends to intensify with 
growing doubts on the administration amid widespread 
reported corruption.”201 
The military reconstituted the NCCC, replacing its 
members, and giving it new powers to investigate some 10,000 
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charges of corruption under the Thaksin government.202 In May 
2007, a reconstituted constitutional tribunal banned Thaksin 
and other top party leaders from participating in politics for five 
years under charges of election fraud. 203  Thaksin’s exile 
mirrored the similar exiles of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif 
in Pakistan and the military’s attempt to exile former prime 
ministers Khaleda Zia and Sheikh Hasina in Bangladesh.  
Thailand’s military-backed government wrote a new 
constitution and approved it by referendum in early 2007, 
officially relinquishing power after elections were held later that 
year.204 The 2007 Constitution promotes guardian institutions to 
limit the power of political parties even more so than the 1997 
Constitution: setting up the Ombudsman’s Office, Counter 
Corruption Commission, Audit Commission, Election 
Commission, and Constitutional Court.205 Half the Senate was 
appointed by a selection committee comprised of the heads of 
these guardian institutions, including judges from the 
Constitutional, Supreme, and Supreme Administrative courts.206 
Perhaps tellingly, many of the constitutional provisions 
surrounding corruption, such as the disclosure of assets, are 
explicitly binding on political functionaries, but make no 
mention of military commanders.207 
These guardian institutions seem premised on the idea that 
politicians are incorrigibly corrupt and at the root of the 
country’s problems, and thus, they deserve to have their powers 
tempered. 208  Further, the institutions embody many 
international “best practices,” thereby helping the military 
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justify its rule as promoting “good governance” more 
generally.209 
In Bangladesh and Pakistan, the military took similar steps 
to strengthen “good governance” while in power. For example, 
in Bangladesh the military not only revitalized the country’s 
ACC during the coup, it also passed a right-to-information law, 
set up a human rights commission, and undertook reforms of 
the judiciary and bureaucracy. 210  In Pakistan, President 
Musharraf promulgated the Freedom of Information Ordinance 
in 2002. 211 The Thai military ultimately went much further in 
institutionalizing such efforts, attempting to use constitutional 
design to tame the perceived excesses of politicians. 
V. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Emergency powers in developed democracies are 
traditionally understood to be invoked to deal with a temporary 
crisis until the normal political order can be restored.212 In the 
developing world they rarely serve similar conservative ends. As 
Victor Ramraj has observed, emergency powers in the 
developing world are often utilized to try to transform a country 
“to bring about the basic conditions of stability upon which a 
constitutional order can take hold.” 213  In other words, 
emergency powers are frequently used in developing countries 
to attempt to create a stable democratic political order, instead of 
protecting and restoring it. 
The “good governance” coups in Bangladesh, Pakistan, and 
Thailand follow this pattern. Military-backed governments 
invoked the specter of unmitigated corruption as a moral failing 
of civilian politicians that justified their intervention into 
politics. The intervention’s goal was stated as eradicating this 
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corruption so that the country can then travel uninhibited down 
the road to democracy. Yet, these three examples also show that 
there are serious reasons to doubt that the military can be any 
more successful than civilian governments in fighting 
corruption.214 Instead, anticorruption efforts are often used by 
the military to consolidate their own power, undercutting 
fledgling democratic institutions in the process and 
perpetuating a climate of corruption and poor governance. 
The military’s use of anticorruption efforts to gain political 
power does not mean corruption should not be combated, nor 
should one question its seriousness. Corruption is a drain on 
economies. It delegitimizes democratic government—as its 
invocation during military takeovers demonstrates—and it is an 
injustice in its own right. 
Mitigating the dangers involved in anticorruption 
campaigns would entail a more evenhanded analysis of 
corruption among politicians and within the military. However, 
domestic and international anticorruption activists face a 
dilemma on this point. If they try to paint a more balanced 
picture by pointing out corruption within the military, they are 
likely to face a promilitary, nationalist backlash that can 
undermine their broader anticorruption efforts. If they do not 
draw attention to corruption within the military, they help foster 
a political environment in which political parties are seen as 
corrupt, and the military a savior, creating an asymmetry that 
promotes military intervention into civilian politics.   
In focusing on the underanalyzed dangers of 
anticorruption campaigns in countries with a politically active 
military, this Article does not attempt to describe a 
comprehensive strategy of how to best combat corruption in 
these contexts. Still, our findings suggest at least three policy 
recommendations to those wanting to fight corruption: (1) be 
politically informed and astute, understanding the potential 
dangers to democratic institutions posed by anticorruption 
efforts, (2) focus reforms on institutions, processes, fair 
elections, and prosecuting low-level actors, and (3) be openly 
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skeptical of the military, including implementing a bright line 
rule against working with military or otherwise nondemocratic 
governments to fight corruption. 
Those who fight corruption must be politically savvy 
enough to pick which efforts will build momentum in the fight 
against corruption. Drawing on a wide variety of successful 
anticorruption experiences both within their country and from 
around the world can aid immeasurably in this effort. Doing so 
requires not only looking at experiences where anticorruption 
efforts have succeeded or failed at  reducing corruption, but also 
where and how they may have contributed to undercutting—or 
strengthening—the broader democratic process. 
To accomplish this, anticorruption activities need to be 
highly sensitive to local context. Outside “best practices” and 
international anticorruption rankings215 can inspire and provide 
a knowledge base to local activists, but ultimately comparisons 
should be limited within a country’s own history of combating 
corruption and the specific forms of corruption that particularly 
undermine “good governance” and democracy within each 
country. Building such internal, country-specific anticorruption 
benchmarks, rather than relying on externally imposed rankings 
that are insensitive to local factors, should be the key focus for 
anticorruption activists in developing countries. 
Creating broad awareness amongst policymakers and 
institutional actors about the potential of anticorruption efforts 
to unintentionally empower the military and undercut civilian 
democratic institutions can act as a powerful countervailing 
force to prevent such outcomes. More specifically, judges should 
be wary of corruption charges brought during a military 
takeover and realize that in affirming these charges they are 
aiding the military in their remake of the civilian political order. 
As the case studies in this Article show, if judges do challenge 
the military’s plans during a “good governance” coup, they may 
exercise more power than they might initially assume. Still, there 
are clear limits to the degree to which the courts can challenge 
military rule, as the dismissal of Supreme Court judges by 
                                                                                                             
215. See, e.g., Corruption Perception Index, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, 
http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi (last visited Feb. 16, 
2012) (providing access to the Corruption Perception Indices from 1995 to 2011). 
778 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 35:737 
General Musharraf in Pakistan demonstrates. Certainly not every 
court can rely on protestors to take to the streets on its behalf, 
but the military needs the validation of courts in these coups 
more than judges might surmise. 
Second, international and domestic activists can mitigate 
the risks of overreach and bias in anticorruption efforts by more 
broadly focusing reforms on institutions, processes, fair 
elections, and prosecuting low-level bureaucrats. Stronger 
institutions like the judiciary can then become new centers of 
political power that not only can help promote anticorruption 
efforts against the government, but also help protect against 
military takeover. By targeting processes, like the government’s 
contracting methods, or laws and policies that are particularly 
susceptible to corruption, rather than individual political 
personalities, anticorruption advocates mitigate the risk that 
they will inadvertently undercut democratic institutions.216 In 
promoting truly competitive democratic elections, these 
advocates help ensure that citizens will choose between 
competing political parties rather than between civilian political 
parties and military rule. Bringing low-level bureaucrats to task 
for graft also makes a tangible difference in people’s lives while 
slowly building a less forgiving environment for corruption.  
Finally, anticorruption activists should refrain from 
supporting anticorruption efforts during a military coup. These 
efforts are likely to fail and are bound to become politicized at 
the expense of civilian democratic leaders and institutions. If the 
military does intervene in governance because of a breakdown 
in law and order, it should adopt a limited mandate that does 
not include a broader “good governance” or anticorruption 
agenda. The international community can play an active role in 
discouraging the military from adopting any such wider goals 
that can be abused for political gain. 
These recommendations are not meant to be exhaustive. 
Rather, they show how an understanding of the risks posed by 
anticorruption campaigns to democratic institutions can help to 
reframe anticorruption strategies. Corruption in all its forms 
should be fought against, but not without first understanding 
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and adjusting one’s strategy to mitigate the unintended adverse 
consequences to democracy that such a fight can unleash. 
CONCLUSION 
Given the history of countries like Bangladesh, Pakistan, 
and Thailand, we can no longer assume that all fights against 
corruption promote democracy. Many of these efforts are 
hijacked for political ends by the military and other self-
interested factions and we should not expect otherwise. 
Anticorruption strategies need to better take this complex 
reality into account. Claims that democratically elected leaders 
should be replaced by supposedly “clean” military leaders or 
neutral technocrats should be evaluated with due skepticism. 
